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NOTES
A particular problem is that the availability of obscene mate-
rials will have an unhealthy effect on the undisciplined and un-
discriminating minds of young people. But adequate measures
other than universal censorship exist for coping with this threat.
The "clear and present danger" test is more tenable in this lim-
ited area, and would support legislation. The parental duty to
provide for the health and welfare of the child provides added
protection. It is submitted that a less strained interpretation of
the first amendment would lead, not to moral chaos, but to a
heretofore unknown spirit of sexual tolerance in the United
States.
"I would give the broad sweep of the First Amendment full
support. I have the same confidence in the ability of our people
to reject noxious literature as I. have in their capacity to sort
out the true from the false in theology, economics, politics, or
any other field." Gerard A. Rault
INSURANCE -EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSES IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY POLICIES
Insured had driven his automobile to a service station to
have it washed and serviced while he was at work. The service
station manager sent an employe, Dronet, to accompany the in-
sured to his place of employment then return the car to the
station. While driving back, Dronet was involved in an inter-
sectional collision with a car driven by plaintiff, who sued
Dronet, the service station owner, and insured's liability carrier
for personal injuries sustained in the collision. The insurance
policy contained a clause excluding coverage with respect "to an
owned automobile while used in the automobile business." The
trial court sustained defendant insurer's motion for summary
judgment denying coverage. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed. Held, the exclusionary clause is susceptible of at least
two meanings and is to be construed against the insurer; thus,
the vehicle being driven with permission of the insured to the
service station by an employe of the station to be washed and
serviced was not being "used in the automobile business" within
the exclusionary clause. Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d
790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 424, 179
So. 2d 18 (1965).
50. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
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An insurance policy is a contract between the insurance com-
pany and the insured to which rules established for the construc-
tion of written instruments apply.' The courts are bound to
give effect to contracts according to the true intent of the par-
ties, such intent to be determined by the words of the contract
when these are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd conse-
quences.2 When a clause is susceptible of two interpretations,
the one that allows coverage must be adhered to rather than
the one that would deny coverage,3 for the reason that am-
biguities should be construed against the drafter. Thus, an ex-
clusionary clause in an insurance policy should be strictly con-
strued.
Two liability policies affording coverage to private automo-
bile owners are in general use today, the Family Combination
Automobile Liability Policy and the Standard Automobile Lia-
bility Policy. These are similar, but the Family Policy is de-
signed to give broader coverage than the Standard Policy.4
Under both the Standard and the Family Policy, one other than
the named or a designated insured may be covered by the
omnibus clause while driving the vehicle if he had permission
from the named insured to use the vehicle and permission had
not been withdrawn prior to the accident.5 However, both these
policies contain clauses which exclude coverage under certain
circumstances. o
In the instant case the policy contained an exclusionary clause
1. LA. CIVIL CoDF art. 1901 (1870) ; Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So. 2d 483 (1947) ; Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191
(1938).
2. Id. art. 1945.
3. Id. art. 1951.
4. The Family Policy provides that any resident of the named insured's house-
hold is an insured with respect to the owned automobile. Permission to use is no
longer a prerequisite to coverage while the owned automobile is being used by a
resident of the named insured's household. Coverage is also extended to the
named insured for the use of any non-owned automobile, whereas the Standard
Policy does not afford coverage when the non-owned automobile is furnished for
the regular usc of the named insured. In addition, any relative who is a resident
of the named insured's household is covered while driving any non-owned private
passenger automobile or trailer not furnished for the regular use of that relative.
The Family Policy also affords protection up to $100.00 for personal property
damaged or totally destroyed by fire or lightning to the named insured, his spouse,
or relative who is a resident of his household. This does not apply to articles
stolen from the owned automobile, however, Also, tires damaged by malicious
mischief are now covered, See Parcher, The New Family Automobile Policy, 24
INS. COUNSEL J. 13 (1957) and Note, 18 LA. L. Rav. 206 (1958).
5. Dominguez v. American Cas. Co., 217 La. 487, 46 So. 2d 744 (1950)
Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d 746
(1949). See Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 626 (1962).
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reading, "This policy does not' apply to an owned automobile
while used in the automobile business." (Emphasis added.) The
policy defined the term "automobile business" as the business or
occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking
automobiles. As the service station employe was driving the
car with the named insured's permission at the time of the
accident, he was an omnibus insured; however, the defendant
insurer contended, and the trial court held, that as he was
driving the car in the course of his employment, the vehicle was
being used in the automobile business and the exclusionary clause
applied. The defendant contended that Nyman v. Monteleone-
Iberville Garage, Inc.,6 was controlling. However, as the court
observed, the wording of the exclusionary clause in Nyman is
different from the clause in the instant case, thus Nyman is
inapplicable. In Nyman, the policy provided that coverage did
not extend, other than to the named insured, "(c) to any person
or organization, or to any agent or employee thereof, operating
an auto repair shop, public garage, sales agency, service station,
or public parking place, with respect to any accident arising out
of the operation thereof" (Emphasis added.) In construing this
language, the Louisiana Supreme Court, like the courts of most
other states,' placed emphasis on the identity or occupation of
the driver at the time of the accident. If the driver operating
the car when the accident occurs is an agent or employe of
someone in the automobile business, as defined in the policy,
then the accident is held to arise out of the operation of such
business and there is no coverage.8
6. 211 La. 375, 30 So. 2d 123 (1947). In this case, Weaver, upon arrival at
the Monteleone Hotel in New Orleans, where he intended to stay, notified the
Monteleone-Iberville Garage, Inc., that he wanted his car stored. Lewis, employee
of the garage, negligently killed the plaintiff's husband while driving the insured
automobile to the garage from the hotel. Plaintiff sued Weaver's insurer, who
defended on the ground that coverage was not extended since the accident arose
out of the operation of the automobile business. The Supreme Court sustained
the insurer's position and denied recovery to the plaintiff.
7. See 47 A.L.R.2d 556 (1956).
8. In 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 4372 (1962), it is stated
that this exclusionary clause does not mean that the named insured is not pro-
tected if liability should be imposed upon him while the vehicle is being used by
someone in the automobile business; but it prevents the insurer from being liable
by reason of any judgment recovered against .the one engaged in the automobile
business.
Where the automobile is being used for pleasure by a friend of the insured
with the insured's permission, it would be of no consequence that such a friend
happened to be an employee of a garage or other establishment in the automo-
bile business. Coverage would still be afforded under the omnibus clause. See
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 326 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
Bany v. Sill, 253 N.W. 14 (Minn. 1934).
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The clause in the instant case employs the words "used in
the automobile business," the word "used" being the key Inter-
pretation of this clause is res nova in Louisiana, but other juris-
dictions have distinguished it from the clause in Nyman, and on
facts similar to those in the instant case have construed the
language in favor of coverageY Most of these courts have con-
cluded that the words "used in the automobile business" require
more than mere possession or control by one in the automobile
business. They are held to refer to an automobile employed for
some purpose of the business, as a tow truck, an automobile
used as a demonstrator, or one used to deliver equipment and
supplies. In the instant case the court found the exclusionary
clause ambiguous and construed it against the insurer. Although
the court was under the impression that the clause in question
had replaced "the old clause interpreted in the Nyman case,"' 10
the two policies actually were of different types. In the instant
case the insured was protected under a Family Policy, while a
Standard Policy was involved in the Nyman case. The wording
of the exclusionary clause in the Standard Policy has not been
changed; it is the same today as it was when Nyman was
decided.
The exclusionary clause exemplified in the instant case has
been replaced in all Family Policies, however, effective January
1, 1963. The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters stated
that the clause had been changed to obviate decisions like that
in the instant case "which have construed the exclusion contrary
to intent."'" The new clause, presently in effect, provides that
subject to stated exceptions the policy does not apply "to an
owned automobile while used by any person while such person
9. See 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4372 (Pocket Part
'1965). See, e.g., Goforth v. AllstateIns. Co., 220 F. Supp. 616 (W.D.N.C. 1963),
which held that an automobile being driven to the garage by a mechanic with
the insurer's permission for further repairs was not being used in the automobile
business. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 404 P.2d 995
(Wash. 1965) held that a service station employee delivering a customer's car
to his home after servicing it did not constitute a use in the automobile business.
LeFelt v. Nasarow, 71 N.J. Super. 538, 177 A.2d 315 (1962) held that a mechanic
who was test driving the insured vehicle to ascertain if the repairs had been
properly made was not using the automobile in the automobile business. But see
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Strohkorb, 205 Va. 472, 135 S.E.2d 913 (1964)
and Trolio v. McLendon, 4 Ohio App. 2d 30, 211 N.E.2d 65 (1965), in which the
court denied recovery under circumstances similar to the instant case.
10. 177 So. 2d 790, 792 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
11. This is stated in correspondence from the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters to the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission, dated September 4,
1962, explaining the reasons for the amendatory endorsements for the Family
Policy.
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is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business."
It would appear that under the facts of the instant case this
new clause would exclude coverage since a service station at-
tendant is a person employed in the automobile business. How-
ever, the recent case of Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,1 2
concerned with a situation similar to that of the instant case,
held that the exclusion of the new clause did not apply because
the accident had occurred while the car was being returned to
the owner. The court emphasized that the service station owner
had completed work on the car; that the accident occurred after
the car had been serviced and not while the service station owner
was employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.
The court stated further: "[0] ut of an abundance of precaution
we further observe that, in any event, the exclusionary clause
under consideration in the instant case is at least ambiguous....
[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against the insurer."' 13
It is submitted that the holding of the instant case is con-
sistent with the public policy of this state to construe insurance
policies liberally in favor of coverage and resolve ambiguities
against the insurer.1 4 This is in accord with notions of public
policy in most states."5 California, for example, considers all
exclusionary clauses such as the ones considered in this Note a
violation of public policy and prohibits them. 1 Most states, Lou-
isiana included, recognize that the chances of a collision while
12. 181 So. 2d 841 (La. App.2d Cir. 1965). It appears -that the language of
the Dumas clause is closer to the language of the Nyman clause than to the Wilks
clause. Nyman refers to an automobile while being driven 'by any person, agent,
or employee of someone in the automobile business with respect to the operation
thereof. Dumas refers to the automobile while being used by any person employed
or otherwise engaged in the automobile business. Thus, since the courts exclude
coverage under the Nyman clause, coverage would also be excluded under the
Dumas clause. However, the same argument may be made with respect to the
Dumas clause as was made in the Wilks case, that the insured automobile must
be actually engaged in the automobile business and not just being driven by an
employee thereof as an incident to the automobile business.
13. 181 So. 2d 841, 843 (1965).
14. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), as amended and re-enacted La. Acts 1962, No.
471, § 1, reads in part: "[A1I1 liability policies within -their terms and limits
are executed for the benefit of all injured persons . . . to whom the insured is
liable; and that it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection and
coverage to all insureds, whether they are named insured or additional insureds
under ,the omnibus clause, for any legal liability said insured may have as or for
a tort-feasor within the terms and limits of said policy."
15. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 297 (1945).
16. In Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 39, 307
P.2d 359, 364 (1957), the California Supreme Court stated: "We are of the
opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover
an accident which occurs when a person, other than the insured, is driving with
the permission and consent of the insured is a violation of the public policy of
this state as set forth in sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code."
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a car is being used in the automobile business are increased, and
have permitted the insurer to limit the risk it desires to assume.
It should be observed that the exclusion forces the claimant to
rely on the service station's policy of insurance.
The construction of the clause "used in the automobile busi-
ness" by the court in the instant case appears sound. A service
station attendant or a mechanic driving a customer's automobile
to or from the customer is not using it in the sense in which a
demonstrator, tow truck, or parts-delivery vehicle is used. How-
ever, since the wording of the clause in question has been
changed in an attempt to avoid the result of the instant case,
some uncertainty will remain until the Louisiana Supreme
Court is presented with the problem of Dumas. As the decision
in Dumas was based on the fact that the work had been com-
pleted and the car was being returned, the question whether
there will be coverage under the new Family Policy if an acci-
dent occurs while the attendant is driving the vehicle to the
service station and before work is begun remains unanswered.
The court in Dumas indicated that the exclusionary clause ap-
plies only while the car is actually being serviced.17 Therefore,
since a vehicle being taken to the station is not actually being
serviced, the policy will probably afford coverage. The exclu-
sionary clause interpreted in the Nyman case has not been
changed, and the courts will probably follow Nyman when deal-
ing with a Standard Policy. If the Supreme Court adopts the
Dumas rule, an owned automobile would be covered by a Family
Policy but not by a Standard Policy under the facts of the in-
stant case. Such a result would be anomalous, since the inten-
tion of the parties under both policies is undoubtedly the same.
Raleigh Newman
INSURANCE - "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES - CONFLICT
BETWEEN ESCAPE CLAUSES AND EXCESS CLAUSES
An automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm
to Grigsby provided that coverage "with respect to a temporary
substitute auto or nonowned auto shall be excess insurance over
17. 181 So. 2d 841, 843 (1965): "We think it is abundantly clear under the
facts of the instant case that the exclusionary clause of the policy would have
applied to Waldrop service station manager who was driving the automobile at
the time of the accident] only while he was actually engaged in servicing the
Brady automobile."
